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Exponential Family Models from Bayes’ Theorem
under Expectation Constraints
Sergio Davis
Abstract—It is shown that a consistent application of Bayesian
updating from a prior probability density to a posterior using
evidence in the form of expectation constraints leads to exactly
the same results as the application of the maximum entropy
principle, namely a posterior belonging to the exponential family.
The Bayesian updating procedure presented in this work is
not expressed as a variational principle, and does not involve
the concept of entropy. Therefore it conceptually constitutes a
complete alternative to entropic methods of inference.
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of maximum entropy (MaxEnt for short) is
considered a fundamental tool in the application of information
theory to the construction of probabilistic models [1]. First
proposed in the context of Statistical Mechanics by J. W.
Gibbs [2] as a derivation of the canonical ensemble from the
requirement of fixed average internal energy, it was recast by
Jaynes [3] as a general principle of reasoning following the
insights of Shannon [4].
This principle of reasoning under uncertainty, that we call
MaxEnt, postulates that the most unbiased probability assign-
ment ρ∗(u) among those probability densities ρ(u) consistent
with given information E, is the one that maximizes the
universal entropy functional
S[ρ; ρ0] = −
∫
U
dnu ρ(u) ln
ρ(u)
ρ0(u)
, (1)
under the constraints imposed by E. Here U is an n-
dimensional state space and u ∈ U a possible state of the
system. The density ρ0(u) is the initial probability density
representing complete ignorance about the value of u.
The maximization problem is solved using the method
of Lagrange multipliers, and for the case of information E
expressed as the given expectation
〈
f(u)
〉
= F the solution
is well-known [3], [5], and corresponds to the standard expo-
nential family of models,
ρ∗(u) =
1
Z(λ)
ρ0(u) exp(−λf(u)) (2)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier which can be determined
from the implicit equation
− ∂
∂λ
lnZ(λ) = F. (3)
The uniqueness of the MaxEnt procedure relies on the
uniqueness of the entropy functional S of Eq. 1, and this has
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been established from consistency requirements [6], [7], [8],
[9]. These axiomatic approaches have allowed a useful sepa-
ration between the operational formalism of MaxEnt updating
(in the sense of formulating an optimal inference rule) and the
meaning of the entropy S being maximized.
In the purely operational vision, entropy is just a convenient
device which allows the ranking of the different candidate
distributions from best to worst, and we do not need to assign
any meaning to it. However, this ranking must, at some point,
be understood in terms of some quality of the candidate models
in terms of which they are rejected or accepted. According to
the standard interpretation of the entropy S by Shannon (later
adopted by Jaynes), the quantity S is a measure of the missing
information needed to completely determine the state u. In
maximizing S we are choosing the least informative model
that agrees with all our constraints.
The original entropy axioms by Shannon [4] as well as
the Shore and Johnson axioms [6] have been recenly put into
question [10] because they rule out the so called generalized
entropies (such as the Tsallis or Renyi entropies) for use
in inference [11]. In this ongoing development it would be
highly desirable to have alternative methods for updating prob-
abilities, and an obvious candidate is Bayes’ theorem itself.
Both MaxEnt and Bayes’ theorem solve essentially the same
problem, namely updating a prior to a posterior incorporating
some new information or evidence, regardless of the nature of
that evidence (measured data or model constraints). Looking
closely, we can in fact recognize the exponential form given
in Eq. 2 as a Bayesian updating from a prior distribution
ρ0(u) to a posterior distribution ρ∗(u) = M(u)ρ0(u) with
an “updating factor”
M(u) ∝ exp (−∑
i
λifi(u)
)
. (4)
If we can arrive at this form of M without invoking a max-
imization of some functional, then we can effectively bypass
the issue of adequacy of S. In a frequentist context (taking
expectations as the limit of statistical averages) Campenhout
and Cover [12] have produced this factor M in the limit of
infinite samples.
In this work we provide a general derivation of the update
rule in Eq. 2 from Bayesian inference subjected to expectation
constraints. Unlike the result by Campenhout and Cover, the
proof does not depend on frequentist assumptions such as the
identification of expectations with averages over samples, or
even the assumption of data samples being processed. It is
based simply on imposing consistency conditions (in similar
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spirit to Cox [13] and Shore and Johnson) on the Bayesian
updating rules themselves to constrain the form of M .
The work is organized as follows. First, in section II, we
present the notation to be used in the rest of the paper and give
an outline of the assumptions needed for the central claim of
the paper. In sections III, IV and V, the exponential form is
obtained from the assumptions.
II. MATHEMATICAL NOTATION AND STATEMENT OF THE
DERIVATION
We will consider in the following a system described by
states u in an n-dimensional state space U . We start from
an arbitrary state of knowledge I0 with probability density
P (u|I0) and our goal is to perform a Bayesian update to a
posterior density P (u|I) where I = I0∧E is the new state of
knowledge that includes the evidence E. We will denote the
expectation of a quantity A(u) under the state of knowledge
J by
〈
A
〉
J
, defined as1
〈
A
〉
J
=
∫
U
dnu P (u|J)A(u). (5)
For the problem of inference with prior P (u|I0) and ev-
idence E given by
〈
f(u)
〉
I
= F , we define the following
consistency conditions:
(a) The probability ratio P (E|u, I0)/P (E|I0) is a unique
functional of the constraining function f , evaluated
using the state u and the constraining value F . That
is, we can write
P (E|u, I0)
P (E|I0) = M [f ](u, F ). (6)
The functional M encodes the method of inference, and
we are looking for a unique method. The only informa-
tion we have in using this method is the evidence E,
which consists of the function f and its expectation F ,
so M cannot depend on any other piece of information,
such as additional parameters.
(b) The inference considering f as a function of u is consis-
tent with the inference considering f as a fundamental
variable. In other words, it should be possible to ignore
the degrees of freedom u and perform an inference over
f itself, using the same functional M . This inference has
to be valid and consistent with the full inference using
u.
(c) Logically independent subsystems U1 and U2 can be
analyzed separately or jointly as U = U1⊗U2, producing
the same result. This does not restrict the method to
separable systems only, it only ensures that if we decide
to apply it to a pair of independent systems, the method
should preserve their independence. The same functional
M must be valid for systems of arbitrary correlation.
1 Note that, if A is a scalar (i.e. invariant under a change of coordinate
system) then 〈A〉
J
is also a scalar, because P (u|J) is a scalar density, which
transforms just as the invariant measure √g(u). Therefore we do not include√
g explicitly in the integral.
In the following we will show that these conditions imply
a posterior
P (u|E, I0) = 1
Z(λ)
exp(−λf(u))P (u|I0). (7)
Here λ is a parameter to be fixed by the value of F , not
a Lagrange multiplier, as there is no variational procedure in
the derivation.
The proof is divided in two parts. First, we prove that
conditions (a) and (b) imply that the functional M [f ](u, F )
is actually a function of two arguments, m(f(u), F ). Finally,
we show that condition (c) implies m(f, F ) ∝ exp(−λ(F )f),
which immediately leads to Eq. 7 after normalization.
III. CONSISTENCY BETWEEN DIFFERENT
REPRESENTATIONS
The evidence E, consisting of the given expectation
〈
f
〉
I
=
F , can be used in two different ways. If we regard the quantity
f as a variable in itself, it can be used to update the prior
P (f |I0) to a posterior P (f |I), given by
P (f |I) = P (f |I0)M [I](f, F ). (8)
Here the functional depends on the identity function f → f ,
denoted by I. On the other hand, we can take f as a function
of the degrees of freedom u, and use the evidence E to update
the prior P (u|I0) to a posterior P (u|I),
P (u|I) = P (u|I0)M [f ](u, F ). (9)
For both problems the same functional M should be used
and yield consistent posteriors. Through the laws of proba-
bility, the probability density of f is always connected to the
probability density of u by
P (f |J) =
〈
δ(f(u)− f)
〉
J
, (10)
for every state of knowledge J , which in our case produces
two independent relations, for J = I and J = I0, namely
P (f |I) =
∫
dnu P (u|I)δ(f(u)− f), (11)
P (f |I0) =
∫
dnu P (u|I0)δ(f(u)− f). (12)
By replacing Eqs. 8 and 9 we find a constraint for M ,
namely
∫
dnu P (u|I0)δ(f(u)− f)
[
M [f ](u, F )−M [I](f, F )
]
= 0
(13)
for any prior P (u|I0). The delta function allows us to replace
f by f(u) in the arguments to M [I], so we have
∫
dnu P (u|I0)δ(f(u)−f)
[
M [f ](u, F )−M [I](f(u), F )
]
= 0.
(14)
Then, taking the functional derivative on both sides with
respect to the prior, we have
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M [f ](u, F ) = M [I](f(u), F ) = m(f(u), F ). (15)
This means that for any constraining function f the func-
tional M reduces to a function of f(u) (the constraining
function evaluated at the state u) and F (the constraining
value); it does not, for instance, depend on derivatives of f .
We have then constrained the form of the posterior distribution
to be
P (u|I) = P (u|I0)m(f(u), F ) (16)
with m a unique function, to be determined.
IV. A THEOREM FOR POSTERIOR EXPECTATIONS
In order to find this universal function m(f, F ) we first
present a useful identity between expectations. Applying
Stoke’s theorem to an arbitrary probability density P (u|J) we
obtain (see the Appendix) the following expectation identity,
〈
∇ · v
〉
J
+
〈
v · ∇ lnP (u|J)
〉
J
= 0, (17)
valid for any differentiable vector function v(u). This is a
generalization of the result in Ref. [14].
Replacing the form of the posterior found in Eq. 16, we
have, for the state of knowledge I ,
〈
∇·v
〉
I
+
〈
v ·∇ lnP (u|I0)
〉
I
= −
〈
v ·∇ lnm(f(u), F )
〉
I
,
(18)
or, more compactly,
〈
D0v
〉
I
=
〈
λˆ(f(u), F )v · ∇f
〉
I
, (19)
where the operator D0 is defined as D0v = ∇ · v + v ·
∇ lnP (u|I0) and
λˆ(f, F ) = − ∂
∂f
lnm(f, F ). (20)
In the next section we will constrain the form of this
function λˆ using the condition (c) on independent systems.
We will show that λˆ only depends on its second argument F .
V. CONSISTENCY BETWEEN SEPARATE AND JOINT
TREATMENT OF INDEPENDENT SUBSYSTEMS
Now let us consider the following situation: two logically
independent systems, U1 and U2 with priors P (u1|I0) and
P (u2|I0) respectively. We can decide to update these priors
separately using the evidence E given by
〈
f1(u1)
〉
I
= F1, (21)〈
f2(u2)
〉
I
= F2. (22)
We could also decide to update the joint system prior
P (u|I0) = P (u1|I0)P (u2|I0), using the evidence
〈
f1(u1) + f2(u2)
〉
I
= F1 + F2. (23)
In both cases we are forced, by condition (a), to use Eq. 16
with the same function m on each case. From Eqs. 21 and 22
applied separately on u1 and u2, we obtain
〈
D0v1(u1)
〉
I
=
〈
λˆ(f1(u1), F1)v1 · ∇f1
〉
I
, (24)〈
D0v2(u2)
〉
I
=
〈
λˆ(f2(u2), F2)v2 · ∇f2
〉
I
, (25)
and from Eq. 23,
〈
D0v(u)
〉
I
=
〈
λˆ(f1(u1)+f2(u2), F1+F2)v ·∇f
〉
I
. (26)
Choosing first v(u1) = v1 and then v(u2) = v2 we find
(calling f12 = f1 + f2),
〈
λˆ(f12, F1 + F2)v1 · ∇f1
〉
I
=
〈
λˆ(f1, F1)v1 · ∇f1
〉
I
, (27)〈
λˆ(f12, F1 + F2)v2 · ∇f2
〉
I
=
〈
λˆ(f2, F2)v2 · ∇f2
〉
I
, (28)
for every choice of v1 and v2. This implies
λˆ(f12, F1 + F2) = λˆ(f1, F1) = λˆ(f2, F2). (29)
As f1 only depends on u1, and f2 only depends on u2, the
last equality means that, in general, the function λˆ(f, F ) does
not depend on f ; it is only a function of the second argument
F , so that we can replace ˆλ(f(u), F ) by λ(F ) such that
λ(F1 + F2) = λ(F1) = λ(F2). (30)
Replacing λˆ(f(u), F ) by λ(F ) into the definition of λˆ (Eq.
20), we have
− ∂
∂f
lnm(f, F ) = λ(F ), (31)
and therefore,
m(f, F ) = m0(F ) exp(−λ(F )f). (32)
The posterior distribution for u in Eq. 16 then reads,
P (u|I) = m0(F ) exp(−λ(F )f(u))P (u|I0), (33)
with m0(F ) fixed by normalization to be
1
m0(F )
=
∫
dnu exp(−λ(F )f(u))P (u|I0) = Z(λ(F )).
(34)
As all the dependence on F is through λ(F ), we can finally
write the distribution entirely as a function of λ, so
P (u|I) = 1
Z(λ)
exp(−λf(u))P (u|I0), (35)
with λ = λ(F ) a number to be determined to agree with the
constraint
〈
f(u)
〉
I
= F . Given this functional form of P (u|I)
we can write the expectation of f as a derivative of lnZ(λ),
〈
f(u)
〉
I
= − ∂
∂λ
lnZ(λ) (36)
and then it follows that the constraint fixes λ through Eq. 3,
as expected.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have proved that Bayesian updating given an expectation
constraint can be established as a uniquely defined procedure,
leading to an exponential family posterior density, which is
the same result produced by the application of the principle
of maximum entropy (MaxEnt) under the same constraints.
We only require that a unique “updating factor” is used in all
cases, and that its use is consistent through different definitions
of the state space. That the same answer is revealed using
an alternative method of inference shows that the essence of
MaxEnt is already contained in Bayes’ theorem under our
additional consistency requirements. This allows a conceptual
unification of the fields of Bayesian inference and MaxEnt
inference under a common framework for continuous degrees
of freedom. Our derivation also shows that the existence of
an entropy functional is not central to the core of inference;
although it certainly provides a more than convenient device
for practical calculations, it is conceptually not required for a
consistent formulation of a theory of inference.
APPENDIX
AN IDENTITY FOR EXPECTATIONS OF CONTINUOUS
VARIABLES
We will consider an n-dimensional manifold U with metric
tensor gµν(u) and induced metric hµν(u) on the surface ∂U
which acts as a boundary of U . Recall the covariant form of
Stoke’s theorem [15],
∫
U
dnu
√
g ∇µωµ =
∫
∂U
dn−1u
√
h nσω
σ, (37)
with ω any differentiable field, n the normal to ∂U and ∇µωµ
the covariant divergence, defined as
∇µωµ = ∂µωµ + ωµ∂µ ln√g. (38)
Now consider the field
ωµ =
P (u|J)√
g
vµ(u), (39)
where the probability density P (u|J) vanishes in the boundary
∂U . Replacing in Eq. 37, we have
∫
U
dnuP (u|J)
(
∂µv
µ + vµ∂µ lnP (u|J)
)
=
∫
∂U
dn−1u
√
h
P (u|J)√
g
nσv
σ = 0. (40)
Defining the expectation
〈
A
〉
J
as
〈
A(u)
〉
J
=
∫
U
dnuP (u|J)A(u), (41)
we arrive at the identity
〈
∂µv
µ
〉
J
+
〈
vµ∂µ lnP (u|J)
〉
J
= 0. (42)
This can be written in a manifestly covariant manner as
〈
∇µvµ
〉
J
+
〈
vµ∂µ ln
P (u|J)√
g
〉
J
= 0. (43)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was funded by FONDECYT grant number
1140514 and partially funded by CONICYT ACE-01 and PIA-
CONICYT ACT-1115 grants. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges conversations with L. Vela´zquez at UCN, Antofagasta
regarding the role of differential geometry in probability the-
ory, and Ariel Caticha on the foundations of entropic inference.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Presse´, K. Ghosh, J. Lee, and K. A. Dill, “Principles of maximum
entropy and maximum caliber in statistical physics,” Reviews of Modern
Physics, vol. 85, pp. 1115–1141, 2013.
[2] J. W. Gibbs, Elementary Principles in Statistical Mechanics. Charles
Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1902.
[3] E. T. Jaynes, “Information theory and statistical mechanics,” Physical
Review, vol. 106, pp. 620–630, 1957.
[4] C. Shannon, “A mathematical theory of communication,” Bell System
Technical Journal, vol. 27, pp. 379–423, 1948.
[5] E. T. Jaynes, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
[6] J. E. Shore and R. W. Johnson, “Axiomatic derivation of the principle of
maximum entropy and the principle of minimum cross-entropy,” IEEE
Trans. Info. Theory, vol. IT-26, pp. 26–37, 1980.
[7] J. Skilling, “The axioms of maximum entropy,” in Maximum Entropy
and Bayesian methods in Science and Engineering (G. J. Erickson and
C. R. Smith, eds.), pp. 173–187, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.
[8] A. J. M. Garrett, “Maximum entropy from the laws of probability,” AIP
Conf. Proc., vol. 568, p. 3, 2001.
[9] A. Caticha and A. Giffin, “Updating probabilities,” 2006.
[10] C. Tsallis, “Conceptual inadequacy of the shore and johnson axioms
for wide classes of complex systems,” Entropy, vol. 17, pp. 2853–2861,
2015.
[11] S. Presse´, K. Ghosh, J. Lee, and K. A. Dill, “Nonadditive entropies yield
probability distributions with biases not warranted by the data,” Phys.
Rev. Lett., vol. 111, p. 180604, 2013.
[12] J. M. van Campenhout and T. M. Cover, “Maximum entropy and
conditional probability,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. IT-27, pp. 483–489, 1981.
[13] R. T. Cox, The Algebra of Probable Inference. John Hopkins, 1961.
[14] S. Davis and G. Gutie´rrez, “Conjugate variables in continuous
maximum-entropy inference,” Phys. Rev. E, vol. 86, p. 051136, 2012.
[15] S. Carroll, Spacetime and geometry: An introduction to General Rela-
tivity. Addison-Wesley, 2004.
